RECENT CASES.*
APPEAL AND 1 RRioR-REV1Ev-ADITIONAL PuooF.-The plaintiff brought
an action to recover compensation for painting a portrait of defendant's
daughter. Judgment was given for the plaintiff. In the argument on appeal,
by consent of counsel it was stipulated that the appellate court might compare the portrait with the daughter who was present. Held: Judgment reversed. The painting was not'a proper likeness. Burton v,. Cornell, 193 N.
Y. S. 529 (App. Div. 1922).
The great weight of authority is that appellate courts can determine a
cause only on the record of the court below and cannot without consent of
the parties hear additional evidence. 4 C. J. 724;" Powers v. -Manning, 154
Mass. 370, 28 N. E. 29 (i89) ; Caldwell v. Farmers' Bank ioo fo. App. 23.
71 S. W. 1093 (19O3). Two early Virginia cases took the opposite view however. Commonwealth v. Banks, 4 Call. (8 Va.) 338 (i798), and Auditor v.
Pauly, 5 Call. (9 Va.) 331 (1804). So photographs not presented in the
court below will not be considered on appeal, Carley v. Jennings, 131 Mich.385, 91 N. W. 634 (xgoz); nor will an appellate court examine a model not
in evidence at the trial, Gulfport Creosoting Co. v. Morrison, 1o3 Miss. 73o.
6o So. 736 (1912) ; nor will it consider exhibits which were not before the
lower court, Freitag v. Union Stock Yard and Transit Co., 2-6 Ill. 551, 104
N. E. 9oi (1914) ; nor affidavits not offered on the trial, Merrill v. Hexter,
52 Or. 138, 96 Pac. 865 (igo8).
When it is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or w avoid a
useless circuity .of proceeding, the present tendency both by statute and by
judicial decision is toward the admission in appellate courts of evidence outside the record. 4 C. J. 725. So in New York it has been held that while
on appeal documentary evidence may not be supplied by the appellant for the
purpose of reversing a judgment, yet it may be introduced for the purpose
of affirming it. Goetz v. Duffy, 171 App. Div. 68c, 157 N. Y. S. 59o (i916).
In the Federal Courts evidence arising since the decree of the trial court,
and hence not on the record, is admissible on appeal, within the discretion of
the court. Ridge v. Manker, 132 Fed. 5M 67 C. C. A. 596 (Iro4). Whenthe evidence is incontrovertible the same result is reached by statute in New
Jersey, P. L 191m, p. 382. In Kansas, the appellate court, independent of the
Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 58o (Gen. St. [io9] See. 6175) and
Lnder extraordinary circumstances, may receive evidence outside the record.
Hess, Harder, and Holmes v. Conway, 93 Kan. 246, 144 Pac. 0-o5 (1914),
affirmed as to the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of U. S. in Holmes v.

*The following recent cases are discussed in the Note Department,
42 Sup. Ct. 449 (1922); Goldin v.
Clarion Photoplays, Inc., 195 N. Y. S. 455 (922); Path6 Exchange, Inc. v.
Cobb, 202 App. Div. 450 (N. Y. ig22) ; -Markle v. Perot, 273 Pa. 4, r16 At].
542 (1922); Jones v. Cook, in S. E. 828 (V. Va. 1922); Commonwealth v.
Valeroso, 273 Pa. 213, 116 Atl. 828 (1922).

xripra: Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
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Conway, 241 U. S. 624, 6o L. ed. 121i (im5). An Ontario Rule (No. 498
[C. R. 1897]) throws the case on appeal open for the reception of further
evidence whenever grounds are shown for obtaining the special leave of the
court, and without leave as to matters which have occurred after the decision below. Re Fraser, 26 Ont. L 5o 8 Dam. L. R. 955 (1912). The principal case is an instance of this tendency. It is doubtful, however, whether
evidence not on the record and not properly before the appellate court should
be heard by them solely on the ground that it was introduced by agreement
of counsel, unless the matter is controlled by statute or previous decision.
Such agreements have been held not to make reviewable on appeal matters
which were not determined on the trial. St. Louis v. Missouri R. Co, 12
Mo. App. 575 (1882); Headrick v. Larson, 152 Fed. 93, St C. C, A. 317
(I.oi).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASSIFICATION FOR TAXATION PURPOSFS-A.NTH1RA-

CITE COAL TAx.-A Pennsylvania statute imposed a tax on anthracite coal
without providing for a tax on bituminous coal. The plaintiff, upon whoni

the tax was levied, brought a bill in equity to have the act declared unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the uniformity clause of the State
Constitution. Held (Moschzisker, C.J., and Kephart, J., dissenting) : The Act
is constitutional. Heisicr v. The Thomas Colliery Company. et at., No. x5,
May Term, 1922, Pa. Supreme Ct. (not yet reported).. The statute referred
to is the Act of May !I, 192r, P. L. 479.

The Constitution of Pennsyl-ania, Art. IX, See. r, provides that taxes
shall be uniform "upon the same class of subjects . . . In holding the
act in question to be constitutional, the court in the principal case opposes the
decision in Commonwealth v. Alden Coal Co., 251 Pa. I34, 96 AtM a6 (iqi5),
and Commonwealth v. St. Clair Coal Co., 251 Pa. i59, 96 At. 254 (1915),
in which the Act of June 27, .1913, P. L. 639, imposing a similar tax, was
declared unconstitutional for lack of uniformity. The Act of 1913 is practically the same as the act in question. The reason given for the decision in
the principal case is that additional facts were brought to the court's attention
which convinced them that anthracite and bituminous coal are so inherently
different and the uses to which each is put are so diverse that the classification
is justified.
It is undoubtedly true that the legislature has the power to classify subjects for purposes of taxation but such classification must have a just and
equal basis and must not be arbitrary. Gulf, etc., Co. v. Ells, i65 U. S. rso,
17 Sup. Ct. 255, 41 L ed. 666 (1897); Juniata Limestone Co. v. Fagley, 187
Pa. 193, 4o Atl. 977 (i898). Many state constitutions contain provisions as to
uniformity similar to that in Pennsylvania. See Stimson American Statute
Law, 85, 86. So, a tax on animals brought into a state for grazing without
taxing those brought in for other purposes is void for want of uniformity.
Carbon Co. v. Routt County, 6o Colo. 2 i~z Pac. 9o3 (i915); Hayes v.
Smith, 58 Mont. 306, 192 Pac. 615 (9220). But a different tax may be imposed
upon the obligations of a private corporation than upon those of an individua,.
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Commonwealth v. Del. Div. Canal Co., 533 Pa. 594, r6 AtI. 584 (189). Foreign insurance companies may be placed in a class by themselves and taxed
independently and differently from domestic insurance corporations. Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 8s Pa. 513 (1877). A Pennsylvania
statute (Act of June 13, i9o7, P. L. 64o), which classifies trust companies for
purposes of taxation and provides a method of determining the actual value
of each share of its stock, was held constitutional in Commonwealth v. Mortgage Trust Co., 22/ Pa. 163, 76 Atl. 5 (ipro). Under a uniformity clause in
the Colorado Constitution almost identical with that in the Constitution of
Pennsylvania, the classification of mines as producing and non-producing mines.
depending upon their gross proceeds, and the valuation thereof at one-quarter
the amount of the gross proceeds, unless the net proceeds exceed one-quarter
of the gross proceeds, in -which event the net proceeds is the valuation, was
held constitutional in Foster v. Hart Mining Co., 52 Co1. 459, 122 Pac. 48
(ip). See Colorado Revised Statutes, r9o8, sections 567, 56j8.
It is submitted that, while there may be other grounds upon which the constitutionality of the act in question may be attacked, the decision in the prificipal case as regards classification is justified. It is significant that the dissenting opinions rested solely on the doctrine of stare decisis, holding that the
,principal case was governed by the decision in Commonwealth v. Alden,
supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWV-EQUAL PgOTECTION-STATUTE PROVIDIxG DIFFERENT

PUNrsxaVxTs IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE STATE FOR SAME OFFENS -rhe

New York Parole Commission Act (Laws i9i c.579, as amended by Laws
1916 e. 287) established different punishments in cities of the first class thani
elsewhere for the samie offense. The relator, sentenced to fifteen months'
imprisonment under this act for an offense the maximum imprisonment for
which was one year (Penal Law [Consol. Laws c. 40] sec. z5), sought his
discharge by habeas corpus proceedings on the ground that this act violated the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Held: Writ dismissed.
People ex rel. Vard v.McCann, i93 N. Y. S. 387 (1921).
Section i of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
"No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." It has frequently been held to be within the legislative
power of a state to declare that certain acts committed in a particular locality
shall constitute a crime, while the same acts committed elsewhere-are not a
crime. People v. Hanrahan, 7s Mich. 61r, 42 N. V. 11z (1880) ; People ex
re. Armstrong v. Warden, etc., i83 N. Y. =3, 76 N. E. Ii (9o5); People ex
rel. Kipnis v. McCann, 19i N. Y. S. 574 0i921). The legislature can also
impose a different punishment upon a corporation than that imposed upon aa
individual for the same offense. State v. Lumber Company, 24 S.D. 136, 123
N.
5V.1o4
(rqo); Small & Co. v. Commonwealth, r3 Ky. 2.72, 120 S. NV.
36r (i909). A statute providing a heavier sentence in a case where the prisoner has teen convicted twice before and committed to prison is not unconstitutional as denying him the equal protqction of the laws. McDonald v.
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21 Sup. Ct. 389 (igOr); Graham v. State
Mass, 18o U. S. 311, 45 L ed. 54.2,
of West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 56-L ed. 917, 32 Sup. Ct. 583 (1g1). Nor is
a statute unconstitutional -which provides that infants tried and convicted'may
be sentenced to a state industrial school until they are 21 years old. State v.
Cagle ct al, III S. C.58, 96 S. E. 291 (1918).
The fact that the offender, sent to the reform school, is detained longer
than if he had been sent to jail does not render such an act void as inflicting
unequal penalties. Exparte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, :9 Pac. 251 (18ga). Also,
the legislature may recognize the youth of offenders' and may modify the
punishment or exempt them from punishment and such classification is valid
where it operates in a uniform manner upon the class... MeLaren v. State,
But where a code fixes the
8- Tex. trim. Rep. 449, ig S. W. 8I (917).
punishment of a prisoner who escapes to a term equal to that which he was
*rving, such provision denies him the equal protection of the laws ald is,
therefore, unconstitutional. Ex parte' Malloa, j6 Idaho 737, 1o2 Pac. 374
(igog). In the light of previous decisions, there can le no doubt that the
statute involved in the principal case was a constitutional exercise of the
legislative power.

CONSTITUTiONAL L.AW-ExTExsio OF POLICE POWER UNDER TIE KonLER
Acr.-A state statute in Pennsylvania prohibited the mining of anthracite coal
under any dwelling situated in a townshij of three hundred or more inhabitants so as to cause a subsidence of the surface. The act allowed afi injunction as a protective measure against any violations. Prior to the passage of
the act, the defendants, having coal under the plaintiffs' land, purchased of
the plaintiffs the right to mine it 'without assuming any obligation to support
the surface. The plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from carrying out
the contract. The defense raised was the unconstitutionality of the act. Held:
The act is constitutional. H. I. Mahon and Margaret Craig Mahon v.*Penissylvania Coal Company, No. 2o, January Term, iz of Supreme Court of
Peunsylvania, (Not yet reported.)
The states have the right to regulate their internal affairs except where
expressly restricted from so doing by the Federal Constitution. This right of
control is designated by a certain undefined term known as "police p6wer."
George V Wickersham, "The Police Power and the New York Einergincy
Rent Laws," 69 IT.OF PA. L Ray., 3oI (gai) ; Cozm. v. Plymouth Coal Company, 232 Pa. 14!, 8i AtL 148 (xgIi). The courts in various decisions have
acknowledged that the states posisess police power, but they have declared un-'
constitutional acts passed thercundf.r which "encroach upon the powers of the
general government." N. 0. Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., ii5 U. S. 65o, 29
L ed. 516, 6 Sup. Ct. 25z (1885). A very broad decision held that "the authority of a State is complete, unqualified, and exclusive" in matters relating
to police power. City of New York v. Miln, xiPet. io2, 12 L. ed. 357 (U. S.
Sup. Ct. 1837). The modem tendency seems to be reverting to an extension
in the police powers of a State, as is evidenced by the recent Rent Cases during
the world war. Marcus Holding Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S.i7o,65 L. ed.
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877, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1920); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 65 L. ed. 865, 4r
See 7o U. or PA. L. REv. 48 (rg2).
Sup. Ct. 453 (920).
The. act involved in the principal case was the Kohler Act. Act of May
i
"27, i92 , P. L. ii9g. Its'constitutionality was attacked upon three grounds;
first, it took property without due process of law; second, it impaired the
obligation of contracts; third, it was local legislation. In answer to the first
point courts have often held that the States have the power of restrictive
legislation because of "the fundamental principle that every one shall so use
his own as not to wrong and injure another." Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,
Provided an act does not take private
97 U. S. 659, 24 L. Ed. '1037 (878).
property for the use of the public without compensation, it is a valid application of police power if it is to offset an existing evil, or to prevent a public
menace. Commonwealth v. Charity Hospital, 198 Pa. 27o, 47 At!. 98o (xooi);
Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Co., supra. State legislation which has forbidden the manufacture and sale of spirituous liquors has been held to be a
valid exercise of police power, and not contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution as it was to protect the health and morals
of the state's citizens. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L ed. 2o5, 8 Sup.
Ct. 273 (1887). The proposition advanced in the recent Rent Cases was that
the situation during the WVorld War "clothed the letting of buildings in the District of Columbia with a- public interest so great as to justify regulation by
law." Block v. Hirsh, supra.
Considering next the second 'ground, the freedom of contract is not an
absolute right, but is a qualified one subject to "reasonable regulations and
prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community." Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 49 L. ed. 643, 25 Sup. Ct. 358 (1904); Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 55 L dd. 328, 31 Sup. Ct.
259 (igto). The states reserve the right to modify certain contracts of public
service corporations which Involve rates. City of Scranton v. Public Service
Commission, 20 Pa. 192, nio Atd. 775 (rg2o). The right of police power is
constant and cannot be limited or contracted away by a-municipality or a
state. Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 5831 52 L. ed.
630, 28 Sup. Ct: 341 (9o8); City of Chattanooga v. Souchern Ry. Co., 128
Tenn. 399, 161 S. NV. iooo (1913). Where the public necessity is great, the
modification of a contract is held to be a valid exercise of police power and
not a wrongful impairment of the obligation of contracts. Block v. iHirsh,
.supra.
'The question as to the local character of the legislation can be answered
briefly. Where laws arise from necessity, the designation of persons, objects
or localities from other groups, is not local -legislation, but general, as it limits
all persons alike that are included in the group. Commonwealth v. Gilligan,
195 Pa. 504, 46 Atl. IZ4. (igoo). The legislature has the powef" to make proper
classifications, and the courts can determine whether "it is founded on real
distinction in the subjects classified." Van Ripqr v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L 123

(1878) ; Seabolt v. Commissioners, 187 Pa. 318, 41 Atl. 22 (i898).
The principal case would not, in the light of the above authorities, seem to
be a drastic extension of police power. The legislation in the Rent Cases was
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passed to meet a mere war emergency; the Kohler Act was framed to meet
a grave public danger of unlimited duration. It is submitted the court did not
err in declaring the act constitutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SERviCE LETTER Acrs.-A state statute required

corporations to give a discharged or resigning employee of ninety days' service or longer a letter stating the nature and duration of such employee's service, and the reason he left their service. The plaintiff voluntarily left the employment of the defendant corporation after ten years of service. The defendant refused to issue a letter in compliance with the above Statute. The defense
raised was the constitutionality of the Statute. Held: The Statute is constitutional. Prudcntial Insurance Company of Amtcrica v. Robert T. Cheek,
U. S. Adv. Ops. 627 (xs2r), 66 L- ed. 627.
It was early settled at common law that the employer owed no duty to
give his discharged enployee a "character," and this same idea is still approved of in our more recent decisions. Carrol v. Bird, 3 Esp. 20t, 6 Revised
Rep. 824 (Eng. i8oo) ; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Jenkins, 174 Ill.
398, 51 N. r. Sxi (18g9). A number of states however, have adopted statutes similar to that of the principal case. Mont. Rev. Codes, sees. 1755-1757;
Neb. Rev. Stat., 1913, sees. 3572-3574; Okla. Rev. Laws 1950, see. 3769. In
several instances such statutes have been held unconstitutional on the ground
that they violated the employers' right of freedom of speech and implied liberty of silence assured by their State Constitutions and that of the Federal
Government. Wallace v. Georgia, C. & N. R. Co., 94 Ga. 73, 22 S. 1. 579
(1894) ; Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown, 8o Kan. 312, 1o2 Pac. 459
(19o9); St. Louis S. NV. R. Co. v. Grifm, iO6 Tex. 477, 171 S. W. 703 (1914).
It is submitted, however that the court did not err in holding the Statute
in the principal case constitutional. The Statute infringes on no constitutional
right. It is really a protection to both the employer and the employee, as it
nasures the former of more easily obtaining the best workers out of employment, and gives the latter a much needed recommendation when in quest of .a
new position.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWN-EIGITEENTiH A-.iENDmFNT-REMOVAL OF.XWIKEY
Fmiow0
ONE FOREIGN VESSEL To ANOTHER IN A UNITED STATES PoRT.-The plaintiff. a British corporation, contracted with a Scotch .e.rrnto transport a quantity of whiskey from Glasgow to Bermuda. It was shipped on a through
bill of lading on one of the plaintiff's vessels and arrived in New York, wbere.it
was to be transferred to another foreign vessel running from New York to
Bermuda. The defendant threatened to seize the liquor, whereupon the plaintiff brought a bill to enjoin him from interfering with the transshipmhent. The
bill was dismissed in the District Court. Held: (McKenna, Day and Clarke, J.
J., dissenting.) The dismissal was proper. Anchor Line v. Aldridge, U. S.

Adv. Ops. 51r, 42 Sup. Ct. 423 (1922).
The Eighteenth Amendment to the' Constitution prohibits

"...

trans-

portation of intoxicating liquors within, th6 importation'thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United Statds

.

. . for beverage purposes . . ."
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The Volstead Act, 4r Stat. 305, 308, provides that "No person shall . . .
transport, import, export, deliver, furnish or possess any intoxicating liquor
. . . and . . . this act shall be liberally construed to the end that the
use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented."
In the principal case it was contended that the removal in question was
not such a "transportation" as was contemplated by either the Eighteenth
Amendment or the Volstead-Act. In Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. et al.,
254 U. S. 88, 6s L. ed. 151, 41 Sup. Ct. 31 (i92-o). the court held that the
Volstead Act was inapplicable to the case where liquor was stored in a safe
deposit room leased by the owner of the liquor, and that he could remove
it to his home under proper permit. This decision is a striking application
of the rule that a statute should not be construed so literally as to reach a
decision manifestly against its spirit and intention. Church of the Holy Trinity v. U. S., 143 U. S. 457, 36 I. ed. 227, 12 Sup. Ct. 511 (1892). In U. S. v.
Gudger, 249 U. S. 373, 63 L ed. 653, 39 Sup. Ct. 323 (i919), it was held that
transportation of liqtor through a state was not transportation into it, within
the meaning of the Post Office Appropriation Act of March 3, 19t7, 39 Stat.
io58, io6g. This position was stoutly upheld by the three dissenting justices
in the instant case, who added that it is not the transportation, but the transportation for beverage purposes that is prohibited by the Volstead Act. The
majority of the court, however, held that the letter of the law was too
strong in this case. The minority also held that Rev. Stat. section 3oo5, Comp.
Stat. sec. 56)0, as amended-by the Act of February 27, 1877, c. 69, sec. i, and
the Act of fay 21, i9oo, C.487, sec. i, which provides that merchandise arriving at any port in the United States destined for any foreign country may be
conveyed through the United States without the payment of duties, was not
repealed by the Eighteenth Amendment or the Volstead Act. The attitude of
the minority is strengthened by Article XXIX of the Treaty with -Great Britain, May 8, i87r, 17 Stat. at L. 863, which provides for the transportation
through the United States of goods arriving at certain ports destined for
British possessions in North America, without the payment of duties. While
there seems to be some doubt as to-whether this article is still in effect, it has
never been formally abrogated! See Treaties, Conventions, etc., vol. I, 7"xi
(xio); Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. IX, 335. The majority
of the court considered this Article as not in effect, and even if it had been
considered otherwise, their decision would have been the-same, since they found
that it conflicted with the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act.
It is submitted that the dissenting opinion commends itself to reason and
justice and is worthy of serious consideration. Aside from the strictly legal
aspect of the situation, the decision in the principal case may precipitate further economic developments unfavorable to our commerce and involve the
government in unnecessary international disputes.
:EQUITY-FRAUDULENT

COnLyANxcEs-AGREEEINTS

To

REcoxVEy.-The

plaintiff, believing that a tort action was soon to be brought against him,
conveyed to the defendant, his wife, certain property in order to save it from
a possible judgment. His wife, at the time of the conveyance, agreed to re-
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convey it to him whenever he wished. there was no evidence that the plaintiff had any creditors. No suit was ever commenced against him, and he sought
reconveyance. This was opposed on the ground that, since the plaintiff conveyed with the intent to defraud creditors, he could not get relief in equity.
Held: (Blackmar P. J., and Jaycox, J., dissenting.) Reconveyance to plaintiff decreed. Tiedeman vr. Tiedenian, r94"N. Y. S. 78& (922).
It is a general rule that when a grantor has conveyed property in order
to defraud his creditors, courts of equity will-not enforce an agreement by the
grantee to reconvey. Hershey v. Weitlng, 5o Pa. 24o (1865) ; Pigg v. Casper
Co., Inc., 196 Fed. 177, x16 C. C. A. 9'(1912) ; Lynch v. Jones, i77 App. Div.
613, i66 N. Y. S. 1047 (1917). For, "he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands." Reynolds v. Boland, 202 Pa. 642 52AtL ig (i9O2) ; Decker
v. Stansberry, 249 Ill.
487, 94 N. E. 94o-(I9ii); Verne v. Shute, 232 Mass. 397,
122 N. ,.
315 (igig).
One line of decisions is in accord with the majority view of the principal
case, which held that the grantor did'not-bring himself within the bounds of
the general rule, when he conveyed to the grantee with the intent to defraud creditors, if he did not-have an actual creditor to be defrauded. Kerrick
v. Mitchell, 68 Iowa 213, 24 1N. WV. x5r(1885) ; Hoff v. Hoff, io6 Kan. W4,i89
Pac. 613 (i92o) ; Gargano v. Vollaro, 116 Atl. 179 (Conn. i922). The purpose

of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act is only to protect the equitable rights of
creditors, and hence the mere motive actuating a conveyance, which in itself
works no injury to creditors, is not sufficient to bring the conveyance within
the statute. So, if there are no creditors, there is no fraud, and the grantor
comes into equity with "clean hands." Riviera v. White, 94 Tex. 538, 63 S.
W. 135 (190) ; Brant v. Brant, ix5 Iowa 7oi, 87 N. V. 406 (1901). See, in
this connection, 49 U. oF PA. L. REv. 66D.

Other courts have reached a decision in agreement -with ihe minority
view of the principal case, deciding that if the grantor conveys with the
intent to defraud creditors, equity will not grant him relief, even though he
had no present creditors. Poppe v. Poppe, 114 Mich. 649, 72 N. NV. 612 (1897) ;
550,-78 N. 1. 919 (i9o6) ; Nunnally v. Stokes, 116 Va.
Jolly v. Graham, 222 Ill.
472, 82 S. E. 79 (i914). They consider that it is against public policy to take
the broad view that equity should protect the grantor who conveyed with the
motive of placing his property beyond the reach of the law. Tantum v.
Miller, ii N. J. Eq. 551 (;858). Furthermore, what actually happens is immaterial for equity sees mora. turpitude in the intention of the grantor. Carson v. Beliles, 28 Ky. L.R. 27-2, 89 S.W. 2o8 (19o5).
The majority view of the principal case represents the weight of authority. This was arrived at by the reasoning that it is more equitable for the
courts to base their decisions on the effect of the grantor's conveyance than
merely on his motive.
GmFrs-REVoc.AToN-CoxDITxON SU sEQUENT IMPLIED.-The defendant had
purchased some property and had the conveyance made to himself and his
wife, the plaintiff, who afterward deserted him and lived in adultery with. another. After the defendant had secured a divorce, the plaintiff brought a bill
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for a division of the property'and the defendant filed a cross-bill to establish
title solely in himself. Held: The plaintiff is not entitled to a division, but,
on the contrary, the husband will be vested with the sole interest, since fidelity
was an impied condition to the gift. More v. More, 278 Fed. 1017 (D. C.
1922).

The plaintiff, in anticipation of marriage, had lavishcd many gifts on the
defendant, who subsequently broke her engagement with. him and mairicd
another. The plaintiff brought this action for the recovery of the gifts. Held:
The plaintiff can recover. Antaraniam,v. Ourakian, 194.N. Y. S. 1OO (1922).
All authorities are agreed that a gift is irrevocable; Garner v. Graves,
54 Ind. x88 (1876); St. Joseph's Orphan Society v. Wolbert et al., 8o Ky.
866 (z882); Williams v. Smith, 66 Ark.

29,

50 S. NV. 513 (1899); but a

transfer subject to an express condition, although commonly called a gift,
has been held to be-no gift at all Irish v. Nutting, 47 Barbour 37o (N. Y.
x867); Hafer v. MeKelvey,

23

Pa. Super. 202 (i9o3).

Courts have found im-

plied conditions in cases where it would be embarrassing for the donor to
express the condition and this was the basic principle underlying the two
instant cases. In Dickerson v. Dickerson ct al., 24 Neb. 530, 39 N. IV. 429
(1M&S), it was decided that the wife by deserting her husband had violated an
implied condition; whereas in Finlayson v. Finlayson, 17 Ore. 347, 21 Pac. 52'
(t889), under like circumstances, the court did not Tmply a condition, and
finding no fraud, would not allow the donor to recover the property. A middle ground was assumed in Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 4o Kansas 494, 20 Pac.
-o3 (1&9), where an equitable partition of the property was ordered. In
many cases, previous misconduct or the contemplation of subsequent misconduct has been held to be such a fraud as will warrant the return of the
property by the court. Stone v., Wood, 85 Ill. 603 (1877); Mildrum v. Mildrum, 15 Colo. 478, 24 Pac. 1o83 (i89); Evans v. Evans, iz8 Ga. 80o, 45 S.
E. 612 (19o3). If, however, the wife has been guilty of some misconduct,
of which the husband is cognizant when the gift was executed, then the gift
is irrevocable. Chew v. Chew, 38 Iowa 405 (1874) ; Lister v. Lister, 35 N.
J. Eq. 49 (1882).
The courts have been more willing to imply a condition to a gift where
it was. made in contemplation of marriage than they have in gifts between
husband and wife-the cases being unvarying in the former instance. Young
v. Burnell, Carey 54 (Eng. i576); Williamson v. Johnson et al., 62 Vt 378,
2o At. 279 (i&8o); Burke v. Nutter, 79 IV. Va. 743, 9x S. E. 812 (1917);
Lumsden v. Arbaugh, 227 S. NW. 869 (I92l). However, this principle has
certain limits, which were first laid down by Lord Hardwicke in Robinson
v. Cumming, 2 Atrk. 410 (Eng. 174,), when he stated in substance that if
"a person has made addresses to a lady for some time upon view of marriage" and gives her presents and she disappoints him afterward, the presents should be returned, but when" the presents are made merely to introduce
a person to the woman's acquaintance, then they need not be returned. See
also Thornton on Gifts & Advancements, sec. 98 and iz7.
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It is submitted that the decisions of the principal cases commend themselves to reason and our conceptions of justice. There is no doubt but that
the donor in both cases, if asked whether fidelity in the one case and marriage in the other were conditions to the gift, would answer in the affirmative and, since to express these conditions would be improper and insulting,
they should be implied.
I-JUNCToNs-RGHT OF GOVERN xENT
To AcT xN LDOR DIsPuTE UNDER
THE CL. ,YrON Acr.-In furtherance of a conspiracy to-aid and abet a strike
on the part of certain railway employes, the defendants were committing certain unlawful acts of sabotage, and certain lawful acts such as individual
picketing, persuading others to leave the railway employment, and also persuading others not to enter the railway employment. Because interstate commerce and the carriage of mails were being obstructed and jeopardized by
this conspiracy, the United States applied for an injunction to restrain the
parties to the conspiracy from committing such unlawful acts, and such
lawful acts as were in furtherance of this unlawful conspiracy. Held: that
the injunction be granted. United States of America v. Railway Employee's
Dcpartment of the American Federationof Labor et al., U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D.
-"
Ill., Equity case No. 2t43 (i9-a2). (Not yet reported.)
The right of the government to present a bill for such an injunction
under its genelal equity jurisdiction is admitted, since the property of the
United States is being jeopardized when the carriage of -mails is interfered
,with, and since the injunction is necessary in order that the government may
fulfill its obligation to protect the public. In re Debs, x58 U. S. 564, 39 L.
ed. io92, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (894). The court, moreover, may, under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (2_6 Stat. L. 209) issue an injunction, where a conspiracy, whether of labor or capital, is impeding the free flow of interstate
commerce. Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197, 48 L. ed., 679, 24
Sup. Ct. 436 (i9o4) ; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 52 L. ed. 488, 28 Sup.
Ct. 3o (I9oS). See Notes supra, p. 48.
The Clayton Act (38 Stat. L.73o), Sec. 6, forbids the restraining of labor
organizations from carrying out their lawful objects. Lawful acts of a
labor organization, if in furtherance of an unlawful restraint of interstate
trade, become unlawful and can be enjoined, even under the Clayton Act.
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.443, 65 L ed. 349, 41ESup. Ct. 172
(i92o), criticized in 34 HARV. L. Rnv. 89, 886 (i92i). The Clayton Act, Sec.
2o, prohibits the enjoining of picketing and peaceful persuasion in any case
between the employers and employes. Picketing is unlawful and can be
restrained even under the Clayton Act, except when done by a single representative. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, Adv. Ops.
U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct. Term, No. 2 (igzi), discussed in 70 U. OF PA. L REv.
ioI (i92z). Any picketing or peaceful persuasion which interferes with
interstate commerce may be enjoined, provided the action is not between the
employers and employees. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, supra. In
enacting that picketing and peaceful persuasion shall not be considered a
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violation of any law of the United States this part of Sec. 2o of the Clayton Act has been held to apply only to cases between employers arid employes. Since this Act limited the equity jurisdiction of the United States
courts, it-was taid that it should be construed strictly. Duplex Printing Co.
v. Deering, supra.
The injunction in the principal case seems to be Proper and based ondecided authority found in the Supreme Court decisions. It may be claimed
that it is in conflict with the Clayton Act, but even in that statute, there is no
obstacle to such an injunction, if it is construed as strictly as hag been done
by the Supreme Court in Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, supra.
INSURANCE-MUTUAL
CompANEs-Ass-5mENTs TO' MEET FuTuE
LossEs AND ExPsFs.-Plaintiff -took out a policy in the defendant company by which he agreed to become "lIable for all losses and expenses of
said company" to the amount of his premium, the policy to be void if assessments to cover such "losses and expenses" be not paid within thirty
days after demand. The plaintiff refused to pay an assessment levied to-pay
"future expenses." Held: Such assessment was valid, and failure to pay it
forfeited the plaintiff's .policy. Knouse v. Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 78 Pa.
Super. 542 (1922).
The right of directors to levy assessments upon a member of a mutual
company is governed by the contract between the member and the company, and the charter and by-laws of the company. Rosenberger v. Wash.
ington Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 87 Pa. 207 (1878); Schultz v. Citizens'
Mutual Life Insurance Co., g Mihn. 308, 6i N. V. 331 (I8g4); Wolcott v.
State Farmers' Mutual Insurance Co., 7y Neb. 742, lio N.
62-8 (igo7).
In general, the directors may not levy assessments to pay future losses or
expenses unless specifically authorized to do so by the contract. Peoples'
Equitable Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Babbit, 7 Allen 236 (Mass. 1863);
Thomas v. Whallon, 31 .3arbour 172 (N. Y. z857); lbs v. Hartford Life
Insurance Co., 12r Minn. 3io, r41 N. AV. 289 (914). When a merpber agrees
to be liable for "losses and expenses" of the company, the weight of authority is that the directors may' levy assessments only to cover losses or expenditures which have already occurred. American Insurance Co. v. Schmidt,
19 Ia. 502 (I865); Farmers' Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Knight, i6z Ill.
470, 44 N. E. 834 (1896) ; Johnson v. Hartford'Life' Insurance Co., 27! Mo.
562, 197 S. 1. 132 (1917). In only one court of last resort has such a provision been consrued so as to render the policy-holder liable to assessment
to meet future losses. Kelly v. Troy Fire Insurance Co., 3 Wis. 254 (1854).
This latter interpretation seems to hold also in Connecticut, although it has
not there come before the Supreme.Court. See Hartford Insurance Co. v.
lbs, 237 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct. 692 (19!5).
The principal case is one of first impression in Pennsylvania. While it
seems expedient that the company should be allowed to accumulate a fund
of reasonable amount for the prompt payment of future claims, yet the
plaintiff never agreed to pay except for losses and expenditures which have
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already occurred. And such seems to be the plain meaning of the clause that
the plaintiff shall be liable only for "losses and expcnse." This is the construction placed upon such a contract in a great majority of the cases, which
have arrived at a decision contrary to that of the principal case. See Ann.
Cas. 19r4 C. 798.
M,[ARRiAE---ANUL-tENT-FR.'UtTLENT

,fSREPRESENITATIONS AS TO CHAR-

AcTER.-A -school girl, iS -years of age, relying on .the defendant's representations that he.was a veteran of the Great War an- employee of the United
States Secret Service, -and, in general,. an honorable member. of society,
eloped with him and married him. A few weeks later, she, having in the
meantime returned to school, discovered that the defendant 'was a professional swindler, whose life had been largely spent in penitentiaries, and who,
shortly after the marriage, was arrested, convicted, and sentenced for further
crimes committed before his marriage. She immediately ceased to have any
further relations whatever with him, and brought suit for annulment of the
marriage. Held: Marriage annulled. Brozns V. Scott, 117 At. 114 (Md.
1922).

The fundamental rule is that a marriage procured by fraud is voidable
at the suit of the injured party, only when the fraud touches what the law
regards as the essentials of the marriage relation. Schouler, Marriage/"
Divorce, etc., 15th Ed., Sec. 1158. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen)*
6o5 (1862). From both an historical and numerical standpoint, the more
strongly established rule, both in England and in most of the American
states, is that fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment as to the defendant's character, wealth, social position, previous history, or habits does not
touch what the law regards as the essence of the marriage, an l is not
therefore, a sufficient ground for annulment. Vakefield v. Mackay, i Phillimore
Ecc. 134 in note (Eng. 18o7). Moss v. Moss, L. R. (1897), Prob. Div. 26s
(Eng.) ; Wier v. Still, 31 Iowa io7 (87"i); Hull v. Hull, Igr Ill. App. 307
(r915); Trask v. Trask, 114 Me. 6o, 95 AtI. 352 (1915);-Wilcox v. Wilcox,
171 Cal. 77o, 155 Pac. 95 (1g16); Chipman v. Johnston, 237 Mass. 502, 13o

N.F_ 65 (192).

The depature from the strict letter of this rule in the principal case,
in which the court decides that extreme fraud as to character and previous
history is a sufficient basis for annulment, is countenanced in several other
American jurisdictions. Keyes v. Keyes, 6 Misc. 355, 26 N. Y. S. 9o (1893);
Entsminger v. Entsminger, 99 Kan. 362 (1916) ; Christlieb v. Christlieb, fixInd.
App. 682, 125 N. B. 486 (i919); Gatto v. Gatto, 79 N. H. i77, io6 AtL 493
(igrg). In all jurisdictions which hold this modem view, non-consummation
of the marriage seems to add 'much to the strength of the plaintiff's case,
Corder v. Corder, 117 At. i2o (Md. 1922), and, in some, to be essential to
its success.

Cox v. Cox, ro Atl. 924 (N. J: Eq. z9o9).

No Pennsylvania decision dealing directly with the question of fraud
:as to character and past history, as a basis for divorce in the nature of
annulment, has been found.
The principal case is representative of the law ina minor, yet grow-
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ing, number of jurisdictions; its doctrine constitutes a departure from the
long-established rule of -the common law. It is submitted that this departure
is dangerous, ih its present undefined state, to the sanctity of the niarriage
status, though rendered less so by the unwillingness 'of the courts to apply
it where consummation has taken'place; but that, on the whole,'it constitutes
a judicial alteration of the law in conformity with the altered social ideas. of
modem times.
"NEGL[GENCE-

ONTRIDUTORY NEGLIGExo

OF GUESTS iN AUTO.MOILE.u-The

plaintiff's intestate, a: minor girl,' was killeM4 when an automobile in which
she was riding,' driven by 4lic "defendant's minor son' at sixty miles an hour,
side-swiped another car. 'The evideflce showed that she acquiesced in andencouraged the speeding which resulted in the tragedy. Held: Judgment for
the plaintiff since the negligence of the driver of an automobile canndt be
imputed to an occupant who had no control over the running of the car.
Tyree v. Tudor et a[.; u I S. E. 714 (N. C. 1922)..
It is now generally held that the doctrine of imputed negligence can not be
applied where no relationship of principal and agent, or of master and servant
exists. But a guest in an automobile is not thereby excused from the duty of
using such care'and caution as is reasonable. It is the duty of a passenger to
warn the driver agairist speeding and recklessness. Hardie, ci u., v. Barrett,
2.51 Pa. 42, ioT At. 75 (x97) ; Elling v. Blake-McFali C6. 85 Ore. 9r, 166
Pac. 57 (917); Russell v. Watkins, 49 Utah 598,.164 Pac. 867- (19T7).
One who encourages or acquiesces in a breach of the rules of safe driving'
is guilty of contributory negligence, and is therefore barred from recovery if
the driver's recklessness causes an accident. This principle applies whenever
the negligence of the driver is such as would be evident to a reasonable man,
using ordinary care. So the occupant of a motor vehicle may be properly
charged with negligence if he permits the driver to proceed at an unreasonable
speed without remonstrance. Rebillard v. Minneapolii, etc., Ry. CV., 216 Fed.
503, 133 C. C.'A. 9 (T914); Fair v. Union Traction Cb, i2o Kan. 61x (r9i8);
Hill v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co, 271 Pa. 232, 514 Atl. 634 (921).
It is therefore submitted that the Supreme Court of North Carolina, while
correctly asserting that the negligence of the driver was not imputed to the
.plaintiff's intestate, overlooked the fact that the evidence clearly showed that
the girl was guilty of independent negligence, which should have been a bar to
the plaintiff's recovery. Renner, et a[., Appellants, v. Tone, ct al., Receivers,
273 Pa. io (1922), the most recent Pennsylvanila case on the subject, substantiates this conclusion. There -the plaintiff, a minor boy, made no remonstrance
against the driver's proceeding on the wrong side of the street and at a too.
great rate'of speed. The Supreme Court, while non-suiting him on other
grounds, declared hin guilty of contributory niegligence as a matter of law.
Whether or not the occupant of a negligently, driven car has himself .used
ordinary care is usually a question for the jury. But it seems that in the printipal case, there was such a complete" acquiescence in the recklessness of the
driver as to make the plaintiff's intestate guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law. Jepson v- Crcsstown St. Ry., 129 N. Y. S. 233 (1gri).
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PRACrC--JOINDER OF Acrios-SmE.RAL DEFUNDANTS.-Thc owner bf an
apartment house brought an action against seven tenants, each occupying a
separate apartment in this house, to recover the reasonable rental value. The
plaintiff demanded a separate judgment against each defendant. The defendants moved for an order to dismiss the complaint for misjoinder of defendants. Held: The joinder is proper under the Code. -S.L, & Co. v. Bock cl
al., 194 N. Y. S. 773 (1922).
Section 211 of the New York Civil Practice Act (Laws 192O, .Ch.- 925),
provides that "all persons may-be joined as defendants against whom any right
to relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative."
Section 212 of the act provides that "it shali not be necessary that each def endant shall be interested as to . . . every ause of action included in any proceeding agaist him."
At common law, counts setting up different causes of action against separate defendants could not be joined. National Bank of Phoenixville v. Buckwalter, 2r4 Pa. 289, 63 AtL 689 (x9o6) ; Battle v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Co., 132 Ga. 376, 64 S. E. 463 (igog). This was modified in England by the
Rules of the Supreme Court, Order x6, Rules 4-5 (1883), from which the provisions of the New York Act, supra, have been taken verbatim.
The English courts at first construed this provision strictly, generally
holding that separate tort-feasors could not be joined as defendants. Gower v.
Coulridge, et al., L R. (i)S9) i Q. B. 348; Thompson v. London City Council, L. R. (1899) z Q. B. 84o; Munday v. South Metropolitan Electric Light
Co. ct al., 29 Times L. R. 346 (Etig. 1913). A count against one defendant in
tort coupled with a count against another in contract was held to be misjoinder. Greenwood v. Greenwood, oo Law Times R.'68 (Eng. i909).
The more recent cases- have been more liberal, generally construing these
rules with reference to Order i6, Rue i, as amended in z896, which allows
joinder of plaintiffs in any case "where if such persons brought separate
actions, any common question of law or fact would arise." Osterreichische
Export A. G. Co. v. British Indemnity Insurance Co. ct al., L. R. (1914) 2 K.
B. 747. Thus, the courts have allowed the joinder of several tort-feasors as
defendants. Re Beck, Attia v. Seed, x8 Law Times R_ 629 (Eng. 1918);
Thomas- v. Moore, L. R. (1918) x K B. 55- It has also been held proper to
join counts against several defendants in contract, when the alleged contracts
relate to the same" subject-matter, or arose-out of the same transaction. Compania Sansinena v. Houlder Bros, & Co.,et al., L1 R. (i 9 so) 2.K. B. 54;
Payne v. British Times Recorder Co. et al, L R. (1921) 2 K. B...
The New"York court has held that counts against three defendants in the
alternative for reasonable rental value could not be joined with, a count
against two of them for damage to the property from their occupation, because the causes of action did not arise out of the same transaction. 137 E.
66th St., Inc. v. Lawrence et al., 194 N. Y. S. 7&z (1922). Both in this case
and in the principal case the court follows the English rule in construing these
provisions with reference to Section 2o9 of the Practice Act, which is taken
from Order 16, Rule i, of the English Rules of the Supreme Court, supra.
The statutes, both in England and New York, leave the enforcement of
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these provisions, within the discretion of the court. England:
Rules of the
Supreme Court, Order 16, Rule I; New York: Laws 1920,
Ch. 925, Sec. t91.
But the tendency of the English cases seems to be towards
an increasingly
liberal construction of the statute. The decision in the
principal case is in
keeping with this tendency, and seems in accord with the
liberal spirit of the
statute.
TRADE UNIONS--SUITs AGAINST UNIONS-SHERM

;AANTI-TRuST

LAw.The plaintiffs were coal companies whose properties had been
greatly damaged
by strikers and whose business had been interfered with
by union miners intimidating the non-union men employed by them. They sued
the United Mine
Workers of America, its officers, and the local district of
the union. One of
the defenses was that the union was an unincorporated body
and could not be
sued. Held: The union could be sued under Sec. 7 of
the Sherman AntiTrust Act. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado
Coal Co., et al.,
U. S. Adv. Ops. 643, 42 Sup. Ct. 750, 66 L. ed. 643 (1922).
This same case was treated fully in66 U. or PA. L RaV.
267, where the
decision of the Circuit Court was commented on and, as
that decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in respect to the above-mentioned
point, no
discussion will be given here. Another feature of the case
is treated in Notes,
supra, p. 48.

TRESI-Ass-AIATOR FLYING Low OvER LN'D.-The
prosecutor made an
information under tie P.ennsylvania Act of April 14, z9o5,
P. L. x69, against
the defendant, an aviator, for hn alleged trespass in flying
over his land, on
which "no trespassing" notices were posted, at a height varying
between fifty
and three hundred and fifty feet. Held: It was not within
the contemplation
of the legislature to make an aeroplane flight over land an
unlavful trespass
punishable under this act. Commonwealth v. Ncvhi and
Smith, Court of
Quarter Sessions of Jefferson County, Pa., April, 19,2. (Unreported.)
This case holds simply that under the present Pensylvania
Act making a
trespass upon posted lands unrawful, an aviator commits no
offense against the
Commonwealth by flying over the land of another.
It does not decide
whether the defendant has or has not infringed the private
rights of the
plaintiff and rendered himself liable in the civil action
of trespass quare
clausum fregit. The public press generally misconstrued
the decision and reported it as holding that an aeroplane flight over land was
not a trespass.
The civil aspect of the situation must undoubtedly some day
arise in this
country, and when it does it will be de novo. Every property
owner, provided
he does not erect a nuisance, has an undisputed right to
build so far into the
air as is possible. Cufus est solum cuffs est usque ad c¢lhon.
That this ancient maxim was not unqualifiedly true was first suggested
by Lord Ellen.
borough in Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Campbell 219 (Eng. 1815),
where he ridiculed
the idea that a baloonist might be liable in quare clautsum
fregit to a farmer
over whose field he sailed. See the note in Bohlen's Cases
on-Torts, Vol. 1,
P. 40.
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While our courts would probably not sustain an action of trespass against
an aviator who flew high above the ground, it seems likely that passing through
what has been called the usable air column would be an infringement of property rights. Ample authority can be found in foreign jurisdictions to support
this view. The British Air Navigation Act, 192o, section 9 (I), provides that
"no action shall lie in respect of trespass . . . by reason of the flight of
aircraft-over any property at a height above the ground . . . which is reasonable." This act vindicates the position of Sir Frederick Pollock in his Law
of Torts, 8th ed, p. 348, where he states the reasonable rule to be that "the
scope of possible trespass is limited to that of effective possession." the
German Imperial Code of igoo, S. poS, established this doctrine when it said:
"The right of the owner of a piece of land extends to the space above the surface . . . The owner may not, however, forbid interference which takes
place at such a height . . . that he has no interest in its prevention."
France in three cases adopted'a similar view. 53 Amm. L Rav. 732 (ig9g).
It is to be hoped that this doctrine will soon become the accepted American rule. To hold that an individual owns the air usque ad ctrlurn would
effectively blast, or at least hopelessly retard, the progress of aviation. But
undoubtedy property owners must be proteted from the noise and danger
of low-flying planes. Under this doctrine the upper strata of the air, like
navigable water, would be free to all while the usable air column would belong to the owner of the land. An invasion of the latter would render the
aviator liable in quare clausum freoZt.
TRusIs-CARITADLE UsE-BEQUEST TO PaocURE CHANGE IN EXIsTING

Lws.-The testator left certain bequests in trust to promote reforms in government such as the initiative, referendum, recall, etc., by advocating changes
in existing legislation. It was contended that the bequest was invalid as being
opposed to public policy. Held (Schaffer, J., dissenting): The trust is valid.
Taylor v. Hoag ct aL., 273 Pa. 194 (1922).
It has always been an established principle that charitable donations op-posed to the laws of the land are illegal. Thus a bequest of slaves in trust,
that they be set free in violation of a state statute, was declared void. Finley
v. Hunter, 2 Strob. Eq. 2i8 (S.C. 1848). Likewise q gift for procuring the
discharge of persons confined under sentence for breach of criminal law was
held invalid, Thrupp v. Collet, 26 Beav. 125 (Eng. i858); and where a bequest was dependent upon the validity of a devise of land which devise was
illegal, the trust was not sustained. Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97 (865). So in
England, a bequest to promote a religious faith, contrary to statute was void.
Da Costa v. De Pas, z Amb. 228 (Eng. 1754); In re Bedford, 2 Swans. 471
(Eng. i8ig); De Themmines v. De Bonneval, 5 Russ. 288 (Eng. iW82).
A trust will not be supported in Pennsylvania where its object is propagation of atheism, infidelity, immorality or in hostility to existing forms of
government Updegraff v. Commonwealth, iiS. & R. 394 (Pa. i824); Vidal v.
Girard's Fxecu(ors, 2 Howard 127 (1844); Zeisweiss v. James, 13 P. F
Smith 465 (Pa. i870).
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But the court in the principal case distinguishes between a proposition
necessitating a violation of thelaw and one attempting to change the existing
law by lawful means. That distinction has been the basis for the decisions
of the majority jurisdictions where a marked tendency is displayed to construe
with considerable liberality all similar bequests. Thus a bequest to a library
was held not to be invalidated by a~condition that no book should be excluded because of its differing from conventional notions on subjects of morals,
medicine and the like. Manners v. Philadelphia Lifirary Co., 93 Pa. 165 (i&o).
In Lewis' Est., 152 Pao 477, 25 Atl. 878 (1893), a trust created to destroy all
discrimination against the colored race in America was held valid despite the
existence of laws in southern states requiring carriers to provide separate cars
for colored persons. In England a bequest to abolish vivisection was declared
to be a legal charity although the purpose of the gift involved the repeal of
an Act of Parliament. Re Foraux, 2 L. R. Ch. Div. 5oi (Eng. 1895). Similarly, bequests for the suppression of the liquor traffic before the prohibition
amendment had beqn adopted were repeatedly held to be charitable trusts.
Haines v. Allen, 78 Ind. roo (iS88); Harrington v. Pier, io5 Wis. 485,.82
N. W. 345 (igoo) ; Buell v. Gardner, Y44 N. Y. S. 945, 83 Misc. 5T3 (1914).
The modem interpretation of a charitable bequest was perhaps carried
to its extreme in the case of George v. Braddock, 45 N. J. Eq. 757, x8 Atl. 881
(039), where it was decided tat a gift to a notoriously radical author for
the distribution of books in which the existing system of holding land was bitterly attacked, was valid, thus overruling the decision oif the lower court in
Hutchin's Executors v. George, 44 N. 3. Eq. r24, 14 At. io3 (1833). The case
of Garrison v. Little, et al., 75 I". App. 4o2 (898) held that a trust to further advocacy of a.change in the constitution for the attainment of woman's
suffrage in the United States was valid, opposing Jackson v. Phillips, 96
Mass. 539 (i867), which represents the minority view in this country. In
that case such a bequest was adjudged invalid as being opposed to. public
policy. But in the same case a trust, created by the same instrument, for the
benefit of fugitive slaves was- allowed as a valid charitable use despite the fact
that at the time harboring such fugitives with knowledge was directly opposed
to the laws sanctioning the system of slavery as it then existed. That ificonsistency led to much unfavorable criticism and finally cdninated in the rejection, in the most important jurisdictions of this country and England, of that
part of the Massachusetts decision which stamped illegal, as a class, all charitable trusts having as their object a change in existing legislation.
If the Massachusetts yiew should be followed to its logical conclusions,
legislative reform would be seriousy hampered and legitimate efforts toward
efficiency in government would be discouraged. The majority view in the
principal case, therefore, it is submitted, is the proper one.
VEHicLEs-HAND SLED AS WVITHIN Ax AcT IN REGULATION THEREOF.In an action of trespass for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff in a
collision between his hand sled and'the automobile of the defendant, the question arose as to whether the plaintiff's sled should have carried a light as pro-
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vided for by the lawt of Pennsylvania, Act of June 12, 1919, P. L. 45r, which
requires, in part : "That . . . from one hour after sunset until one hour
before sunrise, ; . . there shall be displayed on every vehicle, excepting
agricultural machinery and such as are propelled by hand or are loaded with
hay or straw in bulk, while standing or in motion upon any public highway
But nothing in
in the State of Pennsylvania, at least one white light. ...
this act shall affect motor vehicles." Held (Schaffer, J., dissenting): A hand
sled is not a vehicle within the contemplation of the statute, and therefore. is
not subject to the provisions of the act. Idell v. Day, 273 Pa. 34, ii6 Ati. _o6

-

(1922).

The w6rd "vehicle" has been defined as "any carriage moving on land,either on wheels or runners; a conveyance; that which is used as an instrument of conveyance, transportation, or communication," Davis v. Petrinovich,
112 Ala. 654, 21 So. 344 (i8g6); or as including "every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means
of transportation on land." U. S. Comp. Statutes (i9ox), sec. 4.
Courts have held that the word "vehicle" includes within its meaning: a
bicycle, State v. Collins, i6 R. L 371, 17 At. r3! (1888); Holland v. Bartch,
r2o Ind.46, 22 N. E. 83 (89) ; Commonwealth v. Forrest, 170 Pa. 4o, 32 AtL
652 (:Sg5); a dray, City of Memphis v. Battaille, 8 Heisk 524 (Tenn. x873);
Mayor, etc., of Griffin v. Powell, 64 Ga. 625 (i& o); a sleigh, covered, and
carrying six passengers, Marselis v. Seaman, 21 Barb. 319 (N. Y. 1856); a
threshing machine, Heib v. Town of Big Flats, 66 N. Y. App.. 88, 73 N. Y. S.
86 (igoi) ; a street sprinkler, City of St. Louis v. Woodruff, 71 Mo. 92 (1879) ;
a horse-drawn ambulance,. People v. Little, 86 Mich. 125, 48 N. V. 693 (i89i) ;
and a street-car, Frankford Railway Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 58 Pa. ixg
(i868) ; Bridge Co. v. Railroad Co., 114 Pa. 478, 8 At. 233 (i886); Foster
v. Curtis, 213 Mass. 79, 99 . E. 961 (19T2). Contra, -as to a street-car,
Whitaker v. 8th Avenue Rwy. Co, 5i N. Y. 295 (i87/3).
The word has been held not to include: a ferryboat, Duckwall v. City of
New Albany; 25 Ind. 283 (86s), nor locomotives and railway cars, Baltimcre
and Ohio R. R. Co. v. District of Columbia, io App. D. C. iii (1897).
It is submitted that the above decisions are amply sufficient to uphold the
broad definitions of the word given above; and that the narrow interpretation
of its meaning adopted by the majority of the court in the principal case is
unsupported by authority and by the context of the act. In the absence of any
- indications in the act itself of an intention on the part of the legislature to
limit the hpplication of the act to a greater extent than that by which suchapplication is specifically limited, it seems that the court should have applied
the act to a sled as being a vehicle within the usual meaning of the word.
VOLSTEAD AT-C

mm0

NUISANCE DEFiNED.-The
zON

plaintiff-in-error was

convicted of maintaining a nuisance under Title I, Sec. 21 of the National
Prohibition Act of October AS, igi9 (41 Stat 314). He brought a writ of
error on the ground that the indictment alleged that liquor was kept on his
premises for a-single day, whereas several days' possession should have been
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.alleged. Held: The indictment was sufficient. Feigin v. United States, 279
Fed. 1o7 (C. C. A. 9th Circ. r922).
On motion to quash an indictment for maintaining a common nuisance
under Title II, Sec. 2r, of the Prohibition Act, the defendant contended that
. cases of intoxicatthe allegation "the defendants . . . did keep .
ing liquors on board a certain launch" was insufficient since "maintaining,"
under the act, implies continuance. Held: The indictment was insufficient.
United States v. Dowling, et al., 278 Fed. 630 (D. C. S. D. Fla. 1922).
Government agents having made four purchases of alcoholic beer of the
defendant, the plaintiff asked for an injunction under Title 11, Sec. f22, of the
Prohibition Act to abate the nuisance. Held: The plaintiff is entitled to the
relief prayed for, because a single sale accompanied by the unlawful possession
of other liquor is sufficient to warrant an injunction. United States v. Eilert
Brewing. & Beverage Co., 278 Fed. 659 (D. C. N. D. Ohio z921).
Defendant moved to dismiss a bill of complaint filed to enjoin a nuisance
under Title II, Sec. 22, of the Prohibition Act, upon the ground that the allegations should show that the liquor was, habitually sold instead of merely.
stating that liquor was "sold and kept" for sale. Held: The motion must be
granted. United States v. Butler, et al., 278 Fed. 677 (D. C. I. D. N. Y.
1922).

The National Prohibition Act of October 28,.1919, supra, Title IH, See-.2r,
defines a common nuisance as "any room, house, building, boat, vehicle, structure or place where intoxicating liquor is manufactured, sold, kept or bartered in violation of this title."
At common law, any person had the right or privilege without a license
to keep and maintain an ale house. Stephens v. Watson, z Salk. 45 (Eng.
1689-1712) ; Commonwealth v. McDonough, 13 Allen 581 (Mass. j866); z
Bishop, Criminal Law, 8th Ed., Sec. 505. It was only when the ale house became disorderly that it was considered a common nuisance. Stephens v. WVatson, i Salk. 45 (Eng. :689-1712); State v. Bailey, 21 N. H. 343 (i85o); 4
Blackstone's Commentaries x67.
Commencing, with the Act of the British Parliament in 1552 (5 & 6 Fdw.
VI), numerous statutes have been passed in England and the United States
restricting the sale of liquor and making its sale in certain places a common
nuisance. Compiled Laws of Kansas, i88r, Chapter 35, Sec. 13; Iowa Code
1897, Sec. 2384; Compiled Laws of North Dakota, 1913, Sec. 1o117. Under
these statutes it is quite well established that a single sale is not sufficient to
constitute a nuisance. Commonwealth v. Patteron, 138 Mass. 498 (i885);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205 (1887), 8 Sup. Ct. 2-3; Maine
v. McIntosh, 98 Me. 37, 57 Atl. 83 (i9o3). In Bepley v. The State, 4 Ind.
264 (853), however, it was decided that a single sale is sufficient if accompanied by the possession of other liquor; and a single sale alone was held
sufficient in State v. Reyelts, 74 Iowa 499, 38 N. W. 377 (I=88); Scott v. State,
37 N. D. go, 163 N. V. 813 (1917).
The Federal Courts of the United States in 'interpreting "common nuisance" under the Volstead Act have shown much the same divergence of opinion
as did the state under their respective statutes. In an indictment uider Sec. 2r,
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the principal cases illustrate the two views the courts have tafcen when possession of liquor but no sale has been proved: Feigin v. U. S., supra, holding
the posscssion for one day sufficient and U. S. v. Dowling, supra, holding that
the possession should be continuous. Several courts have held that a single
sale of liquor accompanied by the unlawful possession of other liquor will warrant an indictment. Wiggins v. U. S., 272 Fed. 41 (C. C. A. 2nd Circ. i92);
Young v. U. S., 272 Fed. 967 (C.C.A. 9th Cire. 1g2).
Under Sec. 2, U. S. v. Cohen, 268 Fed. 42o (D. C. E. D. M . 1920),
accords with U. S. Butler, supra, in holding that liquor must be continuously sold to warrant an injunction; while Lewinsohn v. U. S. 278 Fed. 42t
(C. C. A. 7th Circ. 1922), accords with U. S. v. Eilert Brewing & Beverage
Co., supra, in holding that one sale together with the possession of other
liquor is sufficient.
It would seem that the reasoning of Judge Faris in U. S. v. Cohen, supra,
is especially commendable. He states that, whereas one sale coupled with the
possession of other liquor may warrant a criminal indictment under the Volstead Act, yet when an injunction is sought to enjoin the inairtenance of a
"common nuisance" the complaint should then allege continuous acts by the
defendants.

